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Reflections On Stare Decisis
JAMES HARDIsTy*
The phrase "stare decisis" mystifies; its Latin form suggests its
obscuring functions. Judicial discussions usually avoid' any men-
tion of the vast academic literature2 on stare decisis, keeping judi-
cial stare decisis formulations more isolated from the reasoning of
commentators than is typical with substantive law formulations.
The central purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of stare
decisis.
Courts divide judicial precedents into two categories. They refer
to precedents in the first category as "stare decisis" and "binding"
while calling those in the second category merely "persuasive. '3 On
occasion this article uses the phrase "stare decisis precedents" to
refer to precedents which courts place in the first category and the
phrase "non-stare decisis precedents" to refer to those that courts
place in the second. The article employs these phrases to examine
judicial usage of the "stare decisis" phrase and concept.
Although the literal meaning4 of stare decisis covers the relation-
ship between judicial and nonjudicial decisions, no one employs the
phrase to apply to these relationships. For example, judges are more
"bound" to stand by the decisions of legislators and constitution
makers than of judges, yet the term "stare decisis" is not applied
to the tendency of judges to follow the decisions of legislators or
constitution makers. Moreover, we have coined no such phrase as
"stare constitutione." In addition, not only judges but private per-
sons and governmental officials are in some sense "bound" by judi-
cial decisions5 yet again the phrase "stare decisis" is not employed
to refer to the obligation of private or public persons to stand by
judicial decisions.
* A.B. 1963, Harvard College; LL.B. 1966, Harvard Law School. Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Washington School of Law.
The author thanks the following persons: Lawrence Crocker and Marjorie Dick Rombauer
for insightful criticism of this article in manuscript; William Andersen and William Chalk
for enlightening criticism of Tables I and II in manuscript; and Donald Chisum, Robert
Fletcher and William C. Powers for edifying conversations.
I E.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union,
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
2 STARE DECISIS AND THE DOCTRINE OF LEGAL PRECEDENT: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (J. Mu-
barak & R. Rich, eds., Asa V. Call Law Library Bibliography ser. No. 83, 1978).
3 E.g., Morgan v. Limbaugh, 75 Ga. App. 663, 666, 44 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1947); Brockton
Say. Bank v. Shapiro, 324 Mass. 678, 684-85, 88 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1949).
"Stare decisis" literally means "to stand by decisions."
E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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This article focuses on stare decisis in American courts. Much
American stare decisis commentary confusingly entangles analyses
of the American and English precedential systems because it fails
to recognize that the United States and Britain have quite different
judicial processes. In particular, Goodhart's perceptive analysis of
precedent in English law is of limited usefulness, because of differ-
ences between the American and English precedential systems. 7
The article explores the boundaries of the concept of stare decisis
by analyzing the distinctions between stare decisis and non-stare
decisis precedents. The first section sets forth the basic assumptions
underlying the article. The second section analyzes the differences
between stare decisis and non-stare decisis precedents arising from
the relationship between the court rendering the precedent and the
court deciding what deference to pay the precedent. The third sec-
tion analyzes the differences between stare decisis and non-stare
decisis precedents arising from the various parts of earlier cases
which courts purport to follow under the principle of stare decisis.
The fourth section further explains the stare decisis categories and
language set forth in the second and third sections. The article seeks
only to explain judicial stare decisis usage, not to justify that usage.8
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
As previously indicated, the main purpose of this article is to
elucidate stare decisis. Since one's view of stare decisis depends on
one's assumptions about law, several assumptions concerning
American law are set forth as a foundation for analyzing stare de-
cisis.
Law is a formal institution by which partly rational beings em-
ploy quasi-moral rules enforced by force to partly govern their be-
havior.' Legal rules'0 ideally function both to facilitate the just reso-
lution of disputes and to shape human conduct in ways beneficial
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930).
These differences are set forth in Hardisty, The Effect of Future Orientation on the
American Reformation of English Judicial Method, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 529-36 (1979).
8 R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDIcIAL DEcIsION 25-31 (1961), analyzes the distinction between
explanation and justification.
' See generally L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 106-18 (rev. ed. 1969); R. POUND, AN
INTRODUcTION TO THE PHmOSOPHY OF LAW 25-30 (rev. ed. 1954).
0 In this article, such phrases as "legal rules" and "rules of law" are employed in a generic
sense to include legal rules, standards, doctrines and principles. See generally Pound,
Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TuL. L. REv. 475 (1933); H.
M. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 155-60 (1958)(mimeographed course materials pub-
lished by Harvard Law School) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
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to society." As a part of the process of adjudicating the disputes of
the litigants before them, courts usually generalize the bases of their
decisions and these generalized bases are rules of law which are
often "by-products" of the dispute settlement. 2
To be more precise, it is assumed that the process of adjudication
involves the three steps of (1) a determination of the law, (2) a
determination of the facts, and (3) an application of the law to the
facts.'" This three-step process produces an argument that is recon-
structable in syllogistic form, that is in the form of "a deductive
argument in which a conclusion is inferred from two premisses
[sic]":'4 the formulation of law is the major premise; the formula-
tion of facts is the minor premise; and the result of the application
of the law to the facts is the conclusion.' 5
For example, a common syllogism provides: "All humans are
mortal" (major premise); and "Socrates is a human" (minor prem-
ise); therefore "Socrates is mortal" (conclusion). The process of
applying a rule of law to the facts can be similarly formulated. For
instance, in Argersinger v. Hamlin" the following rule approximates
" L. FULLR, supra note 9; R. POUND, supra note 9, at 31-47; Hart, supra note 10 passim.
Contra, e.g., T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLs OF GovsR mENT 34, 153 passim (1935); J. CARTER, LAW:
ITS OIuGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCION 120, 130, 135 passim (1907).
,1 Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, Proceedings of the American Society of Inter-
national Law at Its Fifty-fourth Annual Meeting 7 (1960); Hart, supra note 10, at 367, 662-
69.
" Hart, supra note 10, at 373-83; see R. POUND, supra note 9, at 48.
" I. Copi, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 198 (5th ed. 1978). Copi's definition of "syllogism" is
broader than that generally used by 20th century logicians.
,1 The syllogistic form of the basic legal method has been noted by many authorities. See,
e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, Colmrma AnEs 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *396; E. BODENHE!-
MER, JURISPRUDENCE 385-88 (rev. ed. 1974); E. WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 16 n.1 (2d ed.
1894); R. WASSEESTROM, supra note 8, at 15; Guest, Logic in the Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 176, 182-88 (A. Guest ed. 1961); Owens, The Judicial Process, Stare Decisis
and the Restatements, 21 J. ST. B. CAL. 116, 118-19 (1946).
One dissenter is Ronald Dworkin, who has asserted (without citation of authority) that
courts "rarely" explicitly set forth rules of law which they are applying to the facts to justify
their results. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 (1977). In contrast, the author's
analyses of thousands of cases reveal that courts commonly explicitly set forth such rules.
E.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967) (" 'To constitute
an assault and battery,. . . knocking or snatching anything from plaintiff's hand or touching
anything connected with his person, when done in an offensive manner, is sufficient.' ").
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks have asserted that judges have a duty to "generalize" the
basis of their decision (Hart, supra note 10, at 397), apparently meaning that judges must
justify their result by stating a rule which they applied to the facts. However, the judiciary
has not recognized such a duty. E.g., Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 26 (1859); P. CARRINGo
TON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 32 (1976). The only alternative that Hart
and Sacks suggest is facetious: judges might reach and justify a result by flipping a coin. Hart,
supra note 10, at 397. A plausible alternative is for judges to decide or justify a result on the
basis of their ungeneralized intuition of a just result.
I 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
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a major premise: "We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at trial." The following facts approximate a
minor premise: petitioner was a person who had not waived counsel
and had not been represented by counsel at trial. The result approx-
imates a conclusion: petitioner may not be imprisoned for any of-
fense. Because Argersinger's imprisonment was thus illegal, the
Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida which
had denied his petition for habeas corpus. Although neither
Argersinger nor any other legal opinion explicitly sets forth its rea-
soning in strict syllogistic form, all explicit applications of a rule of
law implicitly involve deductive reasoning which could be reformu-
lated as a syllogism.
The above analysis focuses on the importance of rules and deduc-
tive reasoning in justifying judicial results. The article assumes
that judges employ rules of law less extensively in reaching results
than in justifying them. For example, in the Argersinger case, no
contention is made by the author or the Court that the Court's
justifying rule preceded its result. In fact, it seems more plausible
to assume that most or all of the justices first decided to reverse
the Florida judgment, then later formulated the justifying rule.
The article thus assumes that deductive reasoning has a minor
influence on judicial results in the most novel and difficult cases,
such as Argersinger, which constitute the bulk of cases in law
school casebooks. However, it also assumes that deductive reason-
ing has a major influence on judicial results in the mine-run cases
which constitute the bulk of all judicial cases.19
The article also assumes that deductive reasoning plays a minor
role in influencing the content of legal rules. The plausibility of this
assumption is strengthened by the fact that the alternative assump-
tion that this role is major would involve the use of logic in law,
which has drawn the greatest critical fire. An example of such criti-
cal fire is Holmes' assertion that "the life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience."" Holmes was only asserting that
intuitions of morality, public policy and prejudice have been more
" In this article the word "result" means "order" in the sense of" 'the formal order' of a
court." Montrose, The Language of, and a Notation for, the Doctrine of Precedent, 2 U.W.
AUSTL. ANN. L. REV. (pt. 1) 301, 308 (1952).
" See R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 8.
" See, e.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 163-64 (1921).
20o. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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important "than the syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be governed;"'" he was not questioning use of the syllog-
ism once rules of law have been formulated.22
The assumptions set forth in this section are all worth exploring
in their own right, but their exploration is beyond the scope of this
article. The assumptions are not set forth with the contention that
they have been established, although they are widely shared in the
American legal community. The assumptions are to be accepted for
the purposes of the article as useful bases from which to reason
about stare decisis in American law.
DISmICTION BETWEEN STARE DECIsIS AND NON-STARE DECISIS
PRECEDENTS BASED ON IDENTITIES OF PRECEDENTIAL AND
DECISIONAL COURTS
In this article, the phrase "precedential court" refers to the court
rendering the precedent." Similarly, the phrase "decisional court"
refers to the court considering what effect to give the precedent.
Based on the relationship between the precedential and decisional
courts, precedents can be arrayed in terms of their influence, other
things being equal. For example, Table I sets forth such an array
limited to questions of federal law and to interrelationships between
the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
A table similar to Table I but arraying all American precedential
court-decisional court relationships would have tens of thousands of
entries. One important type of entry in such an expanded table
would be the relationships between particular state court-of-last-
resort precedential courts and particular federal decisional court§
z Id.
u After formulating the above, the author discovered similar observations about this pas-
sage by Holmes in E. BODENHmME, supra note 15, at 392.
"1 For example, when the district court in Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.,
47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W. Va. 1942), affl'd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), was deciding what weight to
give the pertinent Supreme Court precedent of Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940), the district court was the "decisional court" and the Supreme Court was the
"precedential court."
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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
TABLE 124
CONTINUUM OF DEGREE OF INFLUENCE OF
PRECEDENTS CATEGORIZED IN TERMS OF
PRECEDENTIAL-DECISIONAL COURT RELATIONSHIPS
Most Influential
Precedents
Precedential Court > Decisional Court
A
Supreme Court - r ; 9th Circuit(intercourt)
[Precedents that
9th Circuit > 9th Circuit are traditionally
Degree of (intracourt) labeled "Binding"Precedential or "Stare Decisis"]
Influence Supreme Court - > Supreme Court
(intracourt)
[Precedents that
9th Circuit Supreme Court are traditionally(intercourt) labeled "Permissive"
or not "Stare
Decisis"]
Least Influential
Precedents
24 The phrases "intracourt" and "intercourt" were invented by Marjorie Dick Rombauer.
A precedent is "intracourt" if the same court is both the precedential and decisional court.
All other precedents are "intercourt."
The only problematical assumption underlying Table I is the assumption that Ninth Cir-
cuit precedents are more persuasive in Ninth Circuit decisions than Supreme Court preced-
ents are in Supreme Court decisions. This assumption is based on the author's impressions
from reading thousands of cases. It is supported by the Ninth Circuit rule prohibiting one
panel of three Ninth Circuit judges from overruling a Ninth Circuit precedent (even when a
panel of three different judges decided the precedent) and instead requiring the panel to refer
the case to the full Ninth Circuit en banc for possible overruling. Ninth Circuit panels are
reluctant to require an en banc session in part because this requires the judges to travel.
A court of last resort such as the United States Supreme Court is generally looser with
intracourt precedents than is an intermediate appellate court such as the Ninth Circuit. One
reason for this difference is that a court of last resort has greater power to reinterpret all earlier
authorities in its jurisdiction to make them more harmonious with each other, with social
[Vol. 55:41
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applying state law under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.25 (These
relationships would be located at "A" in Table I.) Another would
be the relationships between courts of different states in cases not
involving choice of law problems. (These relationships would be at
"B" in Table I.) However adding such entries would not only make
Table I unwieldy, it would also make for numerous problematical
distinctions between relationships of similar influence.
As implied by Table I, judges and commentators assume that the
principle of "stare decisis" applies both to precedents by a hierar-
chically superior court and to intracourt" precedents. 2 However,
when the precedential court is inferior to the decisional court, "stare
decisis" does not apply and the precedent is said to be only
"persuasive." 2
As also suggested by the table, perhaps the distinction between
precedents governed by stare decisis and those not so governed is a
difference in degree masquerading as a difference in kind. The dis-
tinction between stare decisis and non-stare decisis precedents is
primarily a difference in the degree of influence of the precedent.
Supreme Court justices partly defer both to Ninth Circuit and Su-
preme Court decisions, but they defer much more to the latter. If
there is more than this difference in degree between stare decisis
and non-stare decisis precedents, it is not clear what it is.
Any difference in kind between the categories of stare decisis and
non-stare decisis precedents would be manifested in the preceden-
tial effects of the least influential stare decisis precedents (intra-
court precedents) but not in the precedential effects of any non-
stare decisis precedents. As examples, this article analyzes whether
intracourt precedents have any precedential effects differing in
conditions and with the court's sense of justice. Intermediate appellate courts can also serve
such a harmonizing function, but to a lesser degree. Moreover intermediate appellate court
judges develop a habit of deference to precedents of a hierarchically superior court which may
carry over to intracourt precedents. Supreme Court justices have no such habit.
304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie increased the degree of influence of state court precedents in
certain federal cases, particularly those in which federal jurisdiction was based on the fact
that the parties were citizens of different states.
2 For a definition of "intracourt" see note 24 supra.
E.g., American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 ll. App. 3d 275, 280, 364
N.E.2d 948, 952 (1977); Brockton Say. Bank v. Shapiro, 324 Mass. 678, 684-85, 88 N.E.2d
344, 347 (1949); Davis v. Sharp, 30 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (Sup. Ct. 1941); M. ROMBAUER, LEGAL
PROBLEM SOLVING 21 (3d ed. 1978). However, a few commentators have used the phrase "stare
decisis" to refer to the general precedential impact of out-of-state decisions. Green, The
Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied,
40 ILL. L. Iv. 303 (1946); Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Stare Decisis, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 125
(1972).
n E.g., M. ROMBAUER, supra note 27.
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kind from those of the precedents of hierarchically inferior courts.
This analysis is illustrated herein by the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of its own and Ninth Circuit precedents.
The very existence of the separate categories of stare decisis and
non-stare decisis precedents suggests that there might be some dif-
ference in kind between them. Courts sometimes state that stare
decisis precedents are "binding, '29 but they never state that non-
stare decisis precedents are "binding." An analysis of the concept
of "bindingness" in the context of intracourt precedents might re-
veal a characteristic of those precedents not shared by persuasive
precedents.
If a court is "bound" by its own earlier decisions, what is it
"bound" to do? A court's own decisions might be "binding" on it
in the sense that it was "bound" either to follow them or to take
account of them in deciding whether to follow them. In both of these
meanings, a court could be "bound" in the sense of being under a
legal duty or a moral duty, or being compelled by necessity or by
some unspecified force. No doubt, one function of the word "bound"
is to blur all of these meanings.
With respect to its prior decisions, the most plausible meaning of
"bound" is that a court is under a self-imposed legal duty. Such a
self-imposed legal duty means that a court imposes on itself a rule
prescribing that the court shall or shall not do something or shall
do it only in a prescribed way." If there is any such self-imposed rule
governing an American court's treatment of its earlier cases, it is
murky.
Distilled from the murkiness are the following possible self-
imposed rules, each of which would establish a duty on a court with
respect to its own precedents: (1) A court must follow intracourt
precedents subject to specific exceptions. (2) A court must take
following intracourt precedents into account as a positive factor
influencing how it decides later cases. (3) A court must justify the
failure to follow any intracourt precedents cited to it.
Historically, several courts have followed forms of the first sug-
gested rule by requiring themselves to follow their own decisions
unless specific conditions were met. For example, the House of
Lords followed one such conditional rule from 1898 to 1966: the
House required itself to follow its decisions unless they were incon-
sistent with a post-precedent act of Parliament. 1 The English Court
"E.g., Brockton Say. Bank v. Shapiro, 324 Mass. 678, 88 N.E.2d 344 (1949); Staten v.
State, 191 Tenn. 157, 159, 232 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1950).
30 See Hart, supra note 10, at 145.
R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 107-13 (3d ed. 1977). The same rule arguably
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of Appeals (Civil Division) apparently follows another such rule: the
Court requires itself to follow its decisions unless they were given
"per incuriam" or were inconsistent with another of its decisions,
with a decision of the House of Lords or with an act of Parliament.32
Under such rules, both the House of Lords and the Court of Appeals
have been both "bound" by their earlier decisions and under a
"duty" to follow them, according to the ordinary usages of "bound"
and "duty." This is true, even assuming both that the courts could
have changed the rules at any time and that they have had a certain
power of categorization in determining whether prior actions were
inconsistent or '"per incuriam. " American courts have never articu-
lated or followed any such rule when following or overturning intra-
court decisions. 3 Thus American courts are not "bound" to follow
intracourt precedents in the sense of having a "duty" under this first
suggested rule. Therefore, the analysis to this point does not suggest
a difference in kind in the impact of Ninth Circuit and Supreme
Court precedents on Supreme Court decisions.
In contrast, the second suggested rule accords with the way Amer-
ican courts treat their prior published precedents. The second rule,
that a court must take following its precedents into account as a
positive factor influencing how it decides later cases, can be refor-
mulated as follows: a court must follow intracourt precedents unless
this would be inappropriate .3
However, as with the first suggested rule, this second suggested
rule does not involve a difference in kind between judicial treatment
of the published precedents of the deciding court and those of a
hierarchically inferior court. Courts operate under a rule that they
are obligated to give some weight to the desirability of following
both kinds of precedents. Moreover, the tendency to follow both
kinds of precedents advances the same purposes behind the princi-
existed before 1898. Id. Moreover, before 1966, the House of Lords may, have recognized
certain other exceptions to the flat rule of following earlier cases. R-. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN
ENGLISH LAW 130-33 (1st ed. 1961).
' R. CRoss, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 113-16 (3d ed. 1977).
See, e.g., cases cited note 1 supra; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395 (N.Y. 1811); D.
CHAMBERLAIN, THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECIsIS (1885); Goodhart, Case Law in England and
America, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 173 (1930). However, on occasion, American courts in effect have
articulated the stare decisis duty as an obligation to follow certain precedents subject to
amorphous exceptions. E.g., United States v. Minnesota, 113 F.2d 770, 774 (8th Cir.
1940)("[T]he doctrine of stare decisis... should ordinarily be adhered to, unless the reasons
therefor [apparently meaning for the precedential rule] no longer exist, are clearly erroneous,
or manifestly wrong.")
31 Cf. Hart, supra note 10, at 588 (suggesting that there is "a presumption in favor of refusal
to re-examine past holdings, which should yield only to a strong showing of probable error").
See also note 33 supra.
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ple of stare decisis; for example, predictability, efficiency, stability,
impersonality, and uniformity of decision. 5
The usage of "bound" that would be a corrollary to this second
suggested rule is that a court is bound by a precedent if it takes
following that precedent into account as a positive factor influenc-
ing its decision. Under this definition of "bound," the Supreme
Court would be bound by both Ninth Circuit and its own published
precedents because it takes following both such kinds of precedents
into account as a positive factor influencing its decisions and does
so to advance the same stare decisis purposes .3 But this definition
of "bound" seems strained. In particular, this definition would be
uncustomary, as it would cover precedents (such as Ninth Circuit
decisions in the Supreme Court) which are traditionally said to be
"persuasive" but not "binding."
The third suggested rule with respect to intracourt precedents is
that a court must justify the failure to follow any such precedents
cited to it. Again, American courts operate on such a rule. They
refer to their own in point precedents cited to them from which they
are departing and they give reasons for their departure. 3 This rule
differentiates stare decisis from non-stare decisis precedents be-
cause in justifying their decisions, American courts often fail to
mention 8 non-stare decisis precedents from which they depart, even
when such precedents have been cited to the court by counsel. Thus,
this rule is the only one of the three which indicates a difference in
kind between Supreme Court treatment of Ninth Circuit and its
own opinions: the Supreme Court is not "bound" to mention Ninth
Circuit decisions that it is overruling, but is "bound" to justify
departing from its own precedents. Again, however, it somewhat
twists ordinary word usage to say that a court's own precedents are
"binding" merely because it is duty "bound" to justify its departure
from them.
The French legal system offers an interesting comparison with
respect to the above three rules. It is said both that the French
courts do not follow the doctrine of stare decisis3 1 and that they are
31 See, e.g., E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 425-26; R. WASSEBSTROM, supra note 8, at
60-81; Hart, supra note 10, at 587-88.
"' See, e.g., Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975).
37 E.g., Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
38 E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris, the petitioner cited to the Court
the decisions of six federal courts of appeals and fourteen state appellate courts in support of
his argument. See Brief for Petitioner at 12-13. Although Justice Brennan cited these deci-
sions in his dissent, see 401 U.S. at 231 n.4, the majority did not mention them.
3, R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW 55 (1972).
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not "bound" by any judicial decisions. 0 The French courts follow
neither the first nor the-third suggested rules: there is no rule requir-
ing them to follow the prior judicial decision of any court subject to
specific exceptions;4 and they need not justify the failure to follow
any prior judicial decision.42 Indeed, the Court of Cassations, the
leading French appellate court, never mentions any judicial prece-
dents in its opinions.43 Moreover, the French courts are prohibited
from stating rules of law to justify their results except for rules
already stated in statutes.44 In contrast, the French courts do follow
the second suggested rule in that they do in fact give some weight
to the desirability of following earlier judicial decisions. 5 In sum-
mary, the formal precedential authority of French judicial decisions
is most like the authority of Ninth Circuit decisions in the Supreme
Court: only the second rule is followed with respect to such decisions
and they are said to be not stare decisis and not "binding."
One plausible explanation for the existing usage of "binding" and
"persuasive" with respect to American precedents is historical. In
English law prior to 1966, if the precedential court was the same as,
or hierarchically superior to, the decisional court, then the deci-
sional court followed the first rule articulated above: it was required
to follow the earlier decisions, subject to specific exceptions. 6 Thus,
these English precedents were "binding" in the ordinary language
meaning of "binding." The American courts and commentators
may simply have borrowed the English categories. They may have
followed the English pattern in categorizing together as "binding"
both intracourt decisions and decisions by hierarchically superior
courts, even though they did not follow the English rule requiring
courts to follow intracourt decisions subject to specific exceptions.
Thus, the present American usage of "binding" and "persuasive"
may be an historical anomaly.
Another plausible explanation for the division of American pre-
cedents into categories of stare decisis and non-stare decisis is that
the division served rhetorical functions. Even if the origin of the
categories in American law was primarily historical, the retention
of the categories largely serves rhetorical functions. These rhetorical
4, Id. 182. Doctrines analogous to res judicata and the law of the case are exceptions which
are beyond the purposes of this article.
,1 Id. 179-88.
42 Id.
4 Id. 180.
,1 C. civ. art. 5; R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW 180 (1972).
,1 R. DAvED, FRENCH LAW 183-88 (1972).
11 R. CRoss, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW, 103-46 (1st ed. 1961).
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functions will be explored later in the article.
In conclusion, the categories of stare decisis and non-stare decisis
precedents create an illusion of noncontinuity. Instead, it is helpful
to visualize the degree of influence of precedents as varying continu-
ously along a line from the slightest influence to the greatest influ-
ence. Many factors, 47 such as a precedent's age,48 affect at what
point on this line the precedent would be placed. One of the most
important factors affecting the position on this continuum at which
a decisional court would place a precedent is the decisional court-
precedential court relationship. There are, thousands of such rela-
tionships, each creating a slightly different degree of deference to-
ward a precedent. Judges differ somewhat, both about at what point
on the continuum they would place each precedent and about the
order in which they would rank precedential courts in terms of influ-
ence.
The position on the continuum at which a judge would place a
precedent depends largely on his perception of the bearing of the
various purposes of stare decisis, such as neutrality, predictability,
and uniformity. These stare decisis purposes push toward deference
toward all precedents, both "binding" and "persuasive"; but the
importance of these purposes varies with each precedential court-
decisional court relationship. The same stare decisis purposes are
relevant in analyzing the referents of "decisis."
INDETERMINATE REFERENTS OF DEcISIS
In the phrase "stare decisis," the referents of "decisis" are inde-
terminate. More precisely, opinion is divided concerning what parts
of earlier cases are to be followed under stare decisis.45 Frequently,
jurists5 do not seem to be aware of this division of opinion.
Jurists typically assume that the term "decisis" (or "decisions")
stands for one or both of two" referents. In this article, these two
stare decisis concepts will be called "rule stare decisis" and "result
4' A discussion of several such factors can be found in M. ROMBAUER, supra note 27, at 40-
43.
1 On the relevance of the age of a precedent, see Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 249 (1976).
41 E.g., E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 432-39; M. ROMBAUER, supra note 27, at 45-76;
Sartorius, The Doctrine of Precedent and the Problem of Relevance, 53 ARCHrvmS FOR PHILOSO-
PHY OF L. & Soc. PHILOSOPHY 343 (1953).
The word "jurists" denotes both commentators and judges.
" The author acknowledges that it is somewhat artificial to force the referents of "decisis"
into two categories. Nevertheless, this dichotomy is useful for purposes of presentation.
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stare decisis. ' 15 2 Jurists commonly embrace "rule stare decisis" by
explicitly or implicitly assuming that "decisis" denotes judicial de-
cisions to adopt certain rules.53 They sometimes embrace "result
stare decisis" by explicitly or implicitly assuming that "decisis"
denotes judgments5' or other judicial orders given in light of the
material facts.5
Rule Stare Decisis
As previously discussed,1 appellate courts commonly apply rules
to facts to justify their judgments. Under rule stare decisis, a court
follows stare decisis when it adheres to these rules of law expressly
stated in "binding" precedents.
For example, under rule stare decisis, a court adheres to
Argersinger v. Hamlin5" when it expressly applies the generalization
that absent "waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
, * . unless he was represented by counsel at trial."" Under rule
stare decisis, there should be no judicial decisions which distinguish
Argersinger on its facts5' and imprison an unrepresented criminal
defendant. In fact there have been no such reported, decisions.'"
, For an earlier analysis of these two concepts, see Hardisty, supra note 7, at 532-34.
E.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 683 (1972) (plurality opinion by Stewart, J.); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 184 n.24 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hudson v. Guestier, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968); K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRAITON 79 (1960); Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14
A.B.A.J. 71 (1928); Owens, supra note 15; accord, R. CROSS, supra note 32, at 76-79, 103-06.
54 In this article, the word "judgment" means "the ultimate order of a court." Montrose,
supra note 17. This is the usual American meaning of "judgment." See, e.g., Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-72 (1978). In Britain, "judgment" usually means
"the entire judicial utterance containing both [the ultimate order of the court] and the
judges' reasoning leading to the [order]." Montrose, supra note 17, at 310-11.
$1 E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346
U.S. 356 (1953)(per curiam); State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); K.
LLEWELLYN, supra note 53, at 78, 86; Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the and
the Limits of the Common Law Method, 57 B.U.L. Rav. 807, 813 (1977); Sartorius, supra note
49; accord, R. CROSS, supra note 32, at 60, 103-06.
" See notes 12-22 & accompanying text supra.
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
" Id. at 37. See note 16 & accompanying text supra.
11 Argersinger was sentenced to 90 days in jail for carrying a concealed weapon, an offense
punishable by imprisonment up to 6 months and/or a $1,000 fine.
' This conclusion is based on the author's research in the reported cases. Cf. Ingraham,
The Impact of Argersinger-One Year Later, 8 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 615, 623, 637 (1974) (noting
that impact studies reveal little deliberate evasion of Argersinger and that those few recalci-
trant courts are apparently ignoring Argersinger rather than distinguishing it on its facts).
There are reported decisions limiting the scope of Argersinger to its justifying rule. E.g., Scott
v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979); Rollins v. State, 299 So. 2d 586, 588-89 (Fla.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Mahler v. Birnbaum, 95 Idaho 14, 501 P.2d 282, 283 (1972).
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Indeed, rule stare decisis is such a strong part of our system, at least
where the rule is unambiguous and clearly formulated to control
future court decisions, that it would be surprising if any prosecuting
attorneys have argued that Argersinger should be limited to its facts
in order that an unrepresented defendant could be imprisoned.
Prospective holdings furnish other examples of the judiciary em-
bracing rule stare decisis. Especially pertinent are those cases in
which a court announces a new rule of law, to be followed in the
future, but applies the old rule of law to the case at bar.' In these
cases a court tells later judges to follow the promulgated rule and
ignore the result. It is particularly clear that such a court is itself
implicitly defining stare decisis to mean rule stare decisis.
These judicial definitions of stare decisis are the most crucial
ones. To be sure it is an interesting question to what extent the rules
of stare decisis are either judicial inventions or, in contrast, inherent
in the nature of adjudication. This latter natural law aspect of stare
decisis rules is suggested by the tendency of French courts to adhere
to judicial decisions in opposition to orthodox theory.62 It is also
suggested by the advantages to decisionmaking bodies of incremen-
talism, giveA that stare decisis is a form of incremental decision-
making 3 However, in the last analysis, judges themselves have the
power to decide to what part of earlier decisions they will adhere.
Commentators have criticized judges for adhering (or purporting
to adhere) to judicial rules rather than judicial results.64 This criti-
cism has been part of the general academic attack65 on rules in
particular, and formality in general. These commentators, who at-
tack rule stare decisis, appear to assume implicitly that courts
ought not to frame and follow a rule of law that will facilitate
"private orderers"66 and others but rather ought to seek solely the
most just solution for the immediate litigants. However, these criti-
cizing commentators have left the reasons behind rule state decisis
unexplored.
In the face of this criticism courts generally have continued to
1, E.g., Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); State v. Jones 44
N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940).
62 R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW 182-88 (1972).
' Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Incrementalism or Stare
Decisis, 2 LAW TRANSITION Q. 134 (1965).
" E.g., Oliphant, supra note 53; Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 137 (1946).
" E.g., T. ARNOLD, supra note 11. See generally, 1 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 195-287 (1959);
W. PROBERT, LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 3-23 (1972); M. WHrrs, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN
AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (new ed. 1957); Powers, Formalism and Nonformal-
ism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REV. 27, 28-37 (1976).
11 This phrase is from Hart, supra note 10, at 183.
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follow the rules applied in precedents.67 An important part of the
explanation for this judicial tendency lies in the reasons for the
syllogistic form of legal argument and for stare decisis itself.
There are several reasons why articulation of a justifying rule
constitutes part of the paradigmatic appellate court opinion.68 One
reason is that such articulation better allows the appellate court to
shape future decisions by citizens, attorneys, governmental officials,
and lower court judges. From the perspective of those guided by the
rules, an appellate court's articulation of the rule of law for which
its opinion stands increases the predictability of future court deci-
sions, thereby facilitating decisions whether and how to act, to set-
tle, and to litigate. Such increased predictability tends to reduce
litigation and increase the efficient operation of the judicial system.
Such articulation of rules of law also serves to increase the uniform-
ity, deliberateness, correctness, impersonality, and objectivity of
judicial decisions, serving as a check on judicial arbitrariness and
bias. The generalization of judicial results increases not only the
actuality but also the appearance of these benefits, thereby increas-
ing public acceptance of the judiciary and of the law.
Appellate courts articulate rules of law for the same reasons that
they follow the principle of stare decisis. The reasons of guidance,
predictability, efficiency, uniformity and impersonality, 9 which
explain why courts articulate rules of law in the first place, also
explain why courts adhere to those rules in later cases. If there were
no tendency to adhere to the rules, they would only be a snare for
those who relied on them since they were set out for the very pur-
poses of guidance and predictability. The courts, having articulated
the rules in order to increase efficiency, uniformity and impersonal-
ity, must generally follow the rules in order to achieve these values.
Moreover they must appear to follow the rules in order to appear to
achieve these values. Thus, the same factors that explain why a
court applies rules to facts to justify its judgment also partially
explain why precedential justifying rules are among the referents of
decisis in stare decisis. •
17 E.g., Scott v. Gossett, 66 Idaho 329, 335-36, 158 P.2d 804, 807 (1945); American Employ-
ers' Ins. Co. v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 275, 364 N.E.2d 948, 952 (1977); Home v.
Moody, .146 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). These three cases all define stare decisis
in terms of standing by a judicially articulated rule.
u Similar arguments can be made as to why the typical trial court opinion also contains a
justifying rule.
11 For examples of commentators articulating these factors as justifications for stare de-
cisis, see E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 15, at 426-27; R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 8, at 60-
79; Hart, supra note 10, at 587-88.
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French judicial practice offers an instructive comparison. The
French judicial system rejects both judicial promulgation of rules
and stare decisis. 7° The French Civil Code prohibits judges from
setting forth judge-made rules of law in their opinions.7' Any other
position would be inconsistent with French rejection of stare decisis,
since there is no reason to articulate justifying rules if there is no
tendency to adhere to the rules in later cases. The French courts do
justify their results by reference to statutory rules and do accept an
obligation to adhere to statutes. 72 This French rejection of the Amer-
ican judicial practice of articulating and following judicial rules is
seemingly both a cause and a result of the fact that French judges
have less power and prestige71 than American judges.
American judges see value in standing by an announced judicial
rule. Of course, they often see competing values to be weighed
against the advantages of adhering to such a rule. Since one of the
main reasons for articulating a rule is future guidance, judges are
sometimes reluctant to articulate a rule: they may instead choose
to keep future decisions open and to prevent others from relying on
an unreliable standard.
Result Stare Decisis
Under result stare decisis, a court adheres to an otherwise
"binding" precedent regardless of whether it adheres to its justify-
ing rule, as long as similarity in results follows similarity in facts
and a difference in results reflects a difference in facts. An example
of result stare decisis is furnished by the way Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad v. Goodman74 was adhered to in Pokora v. Wabash
Railway Co. 75 In Goodman, the Court adopted the justifying rule
that "if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is
dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle, although
obviously he will not often be required to do more than to stop and
look. ' 76 The Court then concluded that because the truck driver
in that case had neither stopped nor gotten out of his vehicle
"' R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW 179-83 (1972).
7, Id. 180; C. civ. art. 5.
R. DAviD, FRENCH LAW 155 (1972).
73 In support of the assertion that French judges have less power and prestige than Ameri-
can judges, see generally id.; J. MERRYMAN & D. CiARu, ComzIATIW LAw 551-649 (1978);
Salmond, The Theory of Judicial Precedents, 16 LAW Q. Rzv. 376 (1900).
74 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
292 U.S. 98 (1934).
11 Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).
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before he was hit by a train at a railroad crossing he was contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. In Pokora, the Court explicitly
abandoned the justifying rule of Goodman, adopting instead a new
rule and applying it to overturn judgment for Wabash Railway Co.
The Court found the difference in results between Goodman and
Pokora was justified- by a difference in facts. The Court further
stated that the "result" in Goodman was "correct,""7 indicating
that this same result would have been reached in Goodman if the
Goodman court had adopted the justifying rule of Pokora. The
Court in Pokora did not purport to be "overruling" Goodman
although it did acknowledge limiting it.
Several factors explain why courts sometimes follow result stare
decisis. First, in articulating the earlier rule, the earlier court may
not have had certain later disputes in mind.78 Second, even if it had
them in mind, the *adversary method produces data and arguments
more pertinent to a good adjudication of the dispute before the court
than to good adjudications of other disputes which would be covered
by the justifying rule. Third, the earlier rule may have been an
unsuccessful experiment." Fourth, a later judge may be able to
reformulate a precedential rule in a way that better achieves its
purposes." This capacity of a later judge to fine tune a rule may in
part be due to feedback the judge obtained from the operation of
the original rule. Fifth, social conditions and values may have
changed from the time the earlier rule was laid down. In general,
these same needs for flexibility in judicial decisions explain not only
why courts sometimes follow result stare decisis but also why they
occasionally overrule earlier cases.
Distinction Between Holding and Dictum
The problem of the distinction between holding and dictum is a
sub-aspect of the problem of the referent of decisis. Under rule stare
decisis, decisis refers only to those precedential rules of law labeled
"holdings" (or "rationes decidendi") not to those labeled "dicta." 8'
Indeed, the word "dictum" itself points toward rule stare decisis
rather than result stare decisis: "dictum" implies that some rules
of law articulated by the precedential court are not dictum; such
non-dictum rules are, by implication, binding.
" Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 102 (1934).
71 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 64.
7, See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 63.
See, e.g., K. LLEwEmYN, supra note 53, at 99, 298 passim.
" See, e.g., Staten v. State, 191 Tenn. 157, 159-60, 232 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1950).
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In customary usage, the concepts "holding" and "dictum" are
used in the following way: Every legal rule stated in an opinion can
be classified in one or the other of two mutually exclusive categories
labeled "holding" and "dictum." Some legal rules not stated in a
precedential opinion, but for which the precedent can be said to
stand, are also placed in the "holding" category.2 A rule of law that
is the "holding" of a case is "binding" and stare decisis, whereas a
rule which is only "dictum" is not "binding" and not stare decisis.3
A dictum is a judicial statement of a legal rule which was not
"necessary" to the judicial result. 4
The last statement is the most popular definition of dictum.85 Its
popularity seems due to the ambiguity in the word "necessary."
Under one meaning of necessary, a precedential rule of law was
unnecessary if the precedential court could have reached the same
result by applying a different (often narrower) rule of law.88 This
meaning of "necessary" is very popular, since by means of it the
derogatory label dictum can be applied to devalue any precedential
rule of law: every precedential result can be justified by a different
rule than that employed by the precedential court. Under this popu-
lar construction of "necessary" a court can both pay verbal defer-
ence to rule stare decisis, and at the same time, achieve de facto the
advantages of result stare decisis because it may call any undesired
precedential rule "unnecessary" and therefore "dictum" and there-
fore not "bindifig."
There are a number of factors which make a rule of law for which
a case stands more persuasive. In effect, the words "holding" and
"dictum" are employed to indicate that one or more of these factors
are present or absent with respect to a rule of law and thus to
intimate reasons for regarding or disregarding the rule. For example,
a precedential rule is more persuasive if it was explicitly articulated
in the precedent. Moreover, if the rule was articulated in the prece-
dent, it is made more persuasive by each of the following circum-
stances: The rule was necessary to the result in the sense that the
court set forth no alternative rule to justify its result.17 The rule was
necessary to the result in the sense that the opposite party would
12 See, e.g., E. WAMBAUGH, supra note 15, at 20-28.
" See, e.g., United States v. Polan Indus., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 333, 337-38 (S.D.W. Va. 1961);
Staten v. State, 191 Tenn. 157, 159-60, 232 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1950).
" See, e.g., Knight v. State, 273 Ala. 480, 486, 142 So. 2d 899, 905 (1962); Rodriguez v.
Cascade Laundry Co., 185 Kan. 766, 770, 347 P.2d 455, 458 (1959).
83 See, e.g., cases cited note 84 supra.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Cascade Laundry Co., 185 Kan. 766, 347 P.2d 455 (1959).
" See, e.g., Knight v. State, 273 Ala. 480, 486, 142 So. 2d 899, 904-05, (1962).
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have won if the court had adopted the opposite rule.88 The rule was
necessary to the result in the sense that the court applied the rule
to the facts to justify its result. 9 (Or, alternatively, the rule was
necessary to the result in the sense that the court set it forth as part
of the chain of reasoning by which it derived the rule which it
applied to the facts to justify its result.) The rule was necessary to
the result in the sense that it was narrowly confined to the facts.
Each of the above factors makes a rule of law more persuasive and
thus more likely to be laudatorily labeled as a holding. These factors
make the rule of law more persuasive because they indicate it was
more central to the precedential court's tasks: it was more a neces-
sary by-product flowing from the judicial tasks of adjudicating cases
and generalizing each result by stating a justifying rule."0
In summary, a rule of law labeled holding is deemed more influen-
tial in later decisions than a rule of law labeled dictum. The primary
difference between holding and dictum seems again to be a differ-
ence in degree of precedential influence disguised as a difference in
kind. Again, if there is any difference in kind between holding and
dictum, it is unclear what it is.
No Referent of Decisis
Perhaps "stare decisis" should not be analyzed into two words
with each word having a referent. The courts have not so divided
the phrase. Instead, "stare decisis" might be seen as a single phrase
standing for a general theory of "binding" precedent.
Usage of the word "overruling" furnishes a clue to one such
theory. "To overrule a decision" is used as an antonym of "stare
decisis." If courts distinguish precedents by either result stare de-
cisis or rule stare decisis, they do not say that their decisions
"overrule" the precedents. Instead they maintain that their deci-
sions are consistent with the principle of "stare decisis" if they
distinguish all precedents on either basis.
To elaborate, under result stare decisis, a court does not
"overrule" a precedent if it adopts a new justifying rule which is
consistent with the results in both the precedent and the case at bar
even though its result is inconsistent with the justifying rule of the
precedent. Pokora1 is an example.
a E. WAMBAUGH, supra note 15, at 17-18.
S, See, e.g., Montrose, supra note 17, at 326-27.
See notes 12-22 & accompanying text supra.
, Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
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Similarly, under rule stare decisis, if a court in a later case adopts
a new justifying rule which was not considered in the precedent, it
does not purport to "overrule" the precedent as long as the court
adheres to the precedential justifying rule, even if the new justifying
rule is inconsistent with precedential result. For example, prior to
Furman v. Georgia,2 the United States Supreme Court repeatedly
had affirmed judgments involving the imposition of the death pen-
alty against a variety of constitutional challenges.13 Until Furman,
however, the Court had never considered whether the death penalty
itself violated the constitutional prohibition on governmental impo-
sition of cruel and unusual punishment. 4 The Court concluded in
Furman that the cruel and unusual punishment clause at least
partly outlawed the death penalty. In so doing the Court necessarily
rejected the implicit assumption of these precedents that the death
penalty itself was constitutional. Among the opinions supporting
the Court's judgment in Furman, the justifying rule in each justice's
opinion was inconsistent with the results of these earlier capital
punishment cases. However, because these precedents had not ex-
plicitly decided whether to adopt a rule that capital punishment
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in some or all cases, none
of the justices in Furman indicated that the Court was overruling
these precedents.
Boule v. City of Columbia 5 is a second example of rule stare
decisis in which the Court did not purport to "overrule" precedents
although it adopted a new justifying rule which was inconsistent
with precedential results. In Bouie the Court held for the first time
that a state court violated the due process clause" by expanding a
criminal statute retroactively. This rule is inconsistent with the
results of uncited earlier Supreme Court decisions97 which had af-
firmed judgments based on state court retroactive enlargement of
criminal statutes. The Court had only "decided" in those earlier
cases that retroactive judicial enlargement of criminal statutes did
not violate the constitutional provision prohibiting states from pass-
ing any "ex post facto law. '9 8 The opinions in those earlier cases
92 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
" E.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated in part sub nom., Crampton
v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
" The Court has interpreted the 8th and 14th amendments of the Constitution to prohibit
state imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. E.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"5 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
"7 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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did not consider whether to adopt the rule of Bouie that such laws
violated the due process clause, although again the results of those
cases implicitly rejected such a rule. The Court in Bouie did not
purport to "overrule" those cases seemingly because it implicitly
accepted their justifying rule while rejecting their results.
To summarize, it is consistent with judicial usage of "stare de-
cisis" to say that a case is consistent with earlier precedents and
with the principle of stare decisis if the precedents are distingushed
by means of either result stare decisis or rule stare decisis. Thus, one
theory of stare decisis is that it obligates the court to defer either to
the results of the precedent or to the ratio decidendi of the preced-
ent." If a court decides a case consistently with either the result or
the rule of a precedent, it can assert that it is following the true
spirit of stare decisis because it can answer "no" to the basic ques-
tion posed by the principle of stare decisis: Has this been decided
before? If the precedent had either materially different facts from
the case at bar or did not consider the justifying rule of the case at
bar, then in a real sense the decisional court is pondering how to
decide a question that has never been decided.
Variation in Referent of Decisis
The development of the technique of prospective overruling is
inconsistent with the theory of stare decisis set forth in the previous
subsection. Courts have not, and seemingly would not, establish a
rule of law by a prospective holding and then later reject that rule
by substituting a new rule while maintaining that it was not overrul-
ing the earlier case. The more clearly the precedential court has
created reliance interests by adopting rule stare decisis in its opin-
ion, the more hesitant a decisional court would be to adopt a differ-
ent theory in its opinion.
In general, there appears to be a continuum of the extent to which
courts tie themselves and inferior courts down for the future when
deciding a case. This is illustrated by Table II.
Thus, the precedential opinion affects whether future courts will
emphasize rule stare decisis or result stare decisis. If the preceden-
tial court has laid down a narrow rule for predictability, this will
push toward interpretations of that opinion based on rule stare de-
cisis. This tendency will be especially marked if the advantages of
the rule flow only if private orderers follow the rule or if the form of
" Wambaugh's theory of precedent was somewhat similar to this theory. h. WAMBAUGH,
supra note 15.
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TABLE 11100
CONTINUUM OF RESTRICTIVENESS OF PRECEDENTS
CATEGORIZED IN TERMS OF THE FORM BY WHICH THE
PRECEDENTIAL COURT JUSTIFIES ITS RESULTS
Least Restrictive
Precedents
No opinion
Opinion justifying the result
on the basis of unarticulated
intuition of justice
Opinion justifying the result
by a listing of relevant factors
Opinion justifying the result
Degree of by a general principle 01
Precedential
Restrictiveness Opinion justifying the result
by a standard 102
Opinion justifying the result
by a narrow rule which (1) is
supported by stated reasons,
(2) is announced with the word
"hold," (3) is applied to the
facts to reach the result, and
(4) is the only rule stated
Most Restrictive
Precedents
the rule is designed to encourage reliance on it. In contrast, if the
opinion in the first case was unconcerned with predictability, this
will point to result stare decisis.
Stare decisis can be understood better by thus recognizing that
in writing opinions, judges are often not trying to be as precise as
110 Of course a variety of other factors affects the restrictiveness of a precedent. For exam-
ple, reported precedential results and opinions are more restrictive than unreported ones. In
addition, precedential results and rules are more restrictive to the extent they are more
consonant with sound reasons and societal values. See also Table I at note 24 supra.
"I' A principle is a very vague legal proposition. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 10; Hart, supra
note 10.
"' A standard is a somewhat vague legal proposition. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 10; Hart,
supra note 10.
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possible.' Instead they are reaching for the right degree of vague-
ness. They seek properly to balance predictability and flexibility in
light of the times, the subject area and the purposes of the law.
Indeed just as the vague statutory prohibition of "unfair methods
of competition" 04 is a way of delegating power to the Federal Trade
Commission, so a vague judicial standard is a way of delegating
power to future courts.
However, even if a precedential court has applied a vague stan-
dard, such rule stare decisis purposes as uniformity and predictabil-
ity are still important. For example, there is considerable vagueness
in the reasonable person tort standard: A person is generally liable
for the damages caused by his acts if his acts fell below the behav-
ioral standard of a reasonable, prudent and ordinary person under
similar circumstances. 1 5 This standard is so vague that there is
limited uniformity and predictability of results in cases to which it
is applied. Nevertheless, adherence to this reasonable person for-
mula contributes to uniformity of decision because it contributes to
uniformity of procedure in similar cases. In one sense like cases are
decided alike if like cases are decided by like decisionmaking proce-
dures. For example, the results may be different in jury trials of two
similar negligence cases, but the two cases are decided alike in the
procedural sense that the same verbal formula was given to a jury
in both cases. This predictability of what verbal formula will be
followed in jury instructions may also contribute slightly to the
predictability of the result.
In summary, when the justifying rule of a decision is vague, there
is less of a tendency to stand by it than when it is precise because
it is less designed for reliance. But there is some desirability in
standing by a vague justifying rule to facilitate evenhandedness and
predictability of procedure.
Conclusion
The categories of binding and persuasive parts of a precedent
make a continuous relationship falsely appear to be a dichotomous
one. Instead of using these categories, it is more helpful to see the
amount of influence of parts of precedents varying continuously
along a line from the least influential to the most influential.'06
i Similar ideas have been expressed in related contexts. E.g., Curtis, A Better Theory of
Legal Interpretation, 3 VAm. L. Rav. 407 (1950); Hart, supra note 10, at 125-29, 155-60.
'' Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
'' W. PaossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 32, at 150 (4th ed. 1971).
10 Llewellyn similarly concluded that our precedential system involves differences of de-
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Thousands of factors and interactions, some of them previously
mentioned,' 7 influence where on this continuum a decisional court
would place each part of each precedent. For example, one factor
affecting the degree of deference that a decisional court would pay
to a part of a particular precedent would be whether the part was a
justifying rule.
In determining what weight to give each part of each precedent,
courts naturally resort to their visions of the purposes behind the
principle of stare decisis, such as uniformity and neutrality. As
discussed above these purposes behind stare decisis support some
judicial deference toward all precedents. These same stare decisis
purposes point toward deference towards all parts of a precedent.
Uniformity and neutrality are furthered by some deference to every
precedential result, to every precedential rule, and to every reason
cited in a precedent in support of a rule.
In summary, in this area, too, the stare decisis categories create
illusions. We are again confronted with the problem of determining
what function these illusions serve.
EXPLANATION OF STARE DECISIS USAGE,
Tlere are many reasons why stare decisis is such a vague and
confusing concept. The vagueness of stare decisis is functional; it
allows judges flexibility to adapt the law to new conditions." 8 A
vague stare decisis concept is also functional because it provides a
rubric under which judges of conflicting views can coalesce. A
judge's theory of stare decisis is dependent on the judge's theory of
law. Because judges have different visions of the nature of law, they
will have different resulting assumptions about how stare decisis
should and does work. They will have different presumptions about
how much decisional courts should and do defer to various prece-
dential courts. They will have different beliefs about what it is in
an earlier decision that later judges should and do stand by. There
is a need for a concept such as "stare decisis" which is formally
adhered to by judges and yet is vague enough to encompass the
disparate precedential theories held by different judges. In the law's
house, there are many mansions.
gree as indicated by his "Law of Leeways": "[Tihe degree of need dictates the degree and
manner in which it is really correct and proper to exploit the formally available correct and
proper techniques for handling authorities." K. LLwELLYN, supra note 53, at 22-23.
107 See notes 87-90 & accompanying text supra.
lu For a more general discussion, see notes 78-80 & accompanying text supra.
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Stare decisis is a confusing concept because keeping this vague-
ness hidden serves rhetorical functions.109 Categories such as
binding-persuasive and holding-dictum help to hide the vagueness.
Similarly, the particular categorical labels, such as "stare decisis,"
"binding," and "persuasive," also help to hide the vagueness.
The law gains from the appearance of restrictions on judges, pre-
dictability, and deciding like cases alike. The stare decisis catego-
ries and labels serve rhetorical functions by seeming to increase the
amount of such restriction, predictability and fairness. For exam-
ple, both the categories themselves and such labels as "binding"
suggest that courts are more restricted.by past precedents than they
are in fact. The categories and labels thus increase the apparent
force of legal restrictions on the judiciary which in turn increases
public acceptance of both judicial pronouncements and other law.
To the extent that judges appear to be "bound" by the law, litigants
and the general public will tend to accept the law as "binding" on
themselves as well.
More generally, the stare decisis categories and labels tend to
disguise differences in degree as differences in kind. When legal
differences in degree are successfully disguised as differences in
kind, then the apparent predictability and fairness of law increase.
Legal participants, like people generally, consciously or uncon-
sciously tend to present themselves and their work product in a
favorable light. In thousands of ways legal participants have created
a greater illusion of legal certainty than there has been in actuality.
Legal language, explanations and justifications are partly real and
partly illusion. The part that is illusion will always exist because it
is to the advantage of the law and of legal participants to give a
greater appearance of predictability and fairness than there is in
reality. Although flexibility needs to be sacrificed to obtain predict-
ability and uniformity, it need not be sacrificed (as much) to obtain
the appearance of predictability and uniformity. So, by their
choices of words, concepts, and theories, legal participants tend to
create a greater illusion of certainty than there is in reality. The
law's functions of controlling behavior and resolving disputes are
furthered if the law appears predictable and fair. The power exer-
cised by judges as elite, nonelected officials is more acceptable to
the public if it is masked. The retention of the categories and
phrases "stare decisis," "bound," "persuasive," "holding," and
"dictum" serves these rhetorical functions.
" On the rhetorical functions of law, see generally W. PROBERr, supra note 65; Hardisty,
Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 WASH. L. Rsv. 735 (1973).
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In particular, the often unacknowledged multiplicity of referents
of decisis serves these functions of beclouding subsurface judicial
maneuvers. Courts say that they are standing by precedents if they
stand by the announced rule but come to a different judgment on
the same facts by adopting a previously unconsidered rule. Courts
also say that they are standing by precedents if they abandon the
announced rule but stand by precedential results. In both cases,
judges are putting their decisions forth clothed with stability. Since
judges define stare decisis, in both cases they are following stare
decisis by saying that they are following stare decisis if they follow
any part of a prior decision.
Another aspect of understanding why there are many referents of
decisis grows out of the relationship between stare decisis and our
adversary system. An attorney in a lawsuit seeks to buttress his
arguments with as much authority as possible. He sees earlier cases
as devices for showing that his arguments have been previously
accepted. Ideally he will seek to rely on earlier cases in which the
facts were the same as the instant case; the result was the same as
the result the attorney seeks in the instant case; the earlier court
explicitly articulated and applied a rule of law which would require
the result the attorney seeks in the instant case; and the earlier
court stated reasons for adopting the rule which also apply in the
instant case. But lacking such cases on all fours, an attorney will
adhere to as much of earlier cases as is helpful to his arguments. If
the facts and results of the earlier case were similar, an attorney will
rely on them even though no rule was given. If the rule articulated
in the earlier case produces the sought for result in this case, an
attorney will use it to buttress his position even though the facts
were inapposite and no reasons were given. If the reasons given in
an earlier case are helpful to an attorney's position, he will rely on
them and ignore vast differences in the pertinent facts and rules of
law.
But there are two sides to the adversary system. An attorney
trying to undercut judicial reliance on an earlier case will distin-
guish it in as many ways as possible. If the rule of law applied in
the earlier cases literally covers this case but the facts are distin-
guishable, the rule of law will be stigmatized as mere dictum for
being unnecessary (unnecessarily broad) to the earlier decision. If
the facts of the earlier case were similar and the results unfavorable,
the attorney may advance new rules of law or new reasons not con-
sidered in the earlier case and distinguish it because they were not
considered.
So the uses lawyers make of authorities in briefs and otherwise
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depend to a considerable extent on the lawyers' rhetorical purposes.
An attorney relying on an authority will rely on all relevant similari-
ties; an attorney distinguishing an authority will rely on all relevant
differences (and often some irrelevant differences).
When the judges come to write an opinion justifying their result,
the same tendency to use authority rhetorically will be present as
with practicing lawyers, but to a muted extent. There is some tend-
ency for courts to borrow arguments and treatments of authority
from the winning brief. Beyond that, an opinion is a quasi-brief. It
is an instrument of persuasion as well as description. It seeks to
convice other judges on the court that the result is right in order to
gather and hold their votes; it seeks to persuade the parties and
attorneys that they received fair treatment; it seeks to persuade the
public, the bar, and judges making future decisions that the result
was right."' Of course, the author of the opinion will also be trying
to convince himself that the result is right.
Because of these persuasive functions of opinions, in writing an
opinion each judge consciously or unconsciously strives to convince
himself and others of the high predictability of the resulting judg-
ment. He also strives to persuade everyone that the result and justi-
fying rule are harmonious with the rest of law and thus that like
cases are being decided alike.
In view of the advantages of the actuality and appearance of
adhering to and harmonizing with authorities, judges will seek to
support their result by pointing to similarities of fact, rule or reason
articulated in earlier cases or, if possible, some combination of
these. Similarly, opinions will emphasize the ways in which they are
adhering to earlier cases even when they are following the authority
in part and undercutting it in part. If they can distinguish the facts
or the rule of the earlier case, then they may claim that they are not
overruling the earlier case, but instead are following stare decisis.
Thus the multiplicity of referents of decisis serves the persuasive
purposes of judges and practicing lawyers and would seem to be
endemic to an adversary system based on justification in terms of
similarity to and differences from prior decisions.
Another possible reason for dichotomous stare decisis categories
is that the human mind might have a natural affinity for dichoto-
mous thinking."' Thus, people might have a tendency to impose
dichotomous categories such as "binding" and "persuasive" on rela-
tionships that are continuous.
" For a similar list, see K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 53, at 132.
" There is a "proneness in the human mind to attack problems by binary classification."
E. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATU= 181 (1978).
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Moreover, "reason" has a high honorific value in law. The em-
ployment of mutually exclusive categories requires a demonstration
of the operation of deductive reasoning. Dichotomous categories
such as "holding" and "dictum" thus serve the function of increas-
ing the apparent role of reason in the solution of legal problems.
The law disguises differences in degree as differences in kind in
many subject areas other than precedent. One notable example is
the much criticized two-tier method of analysis in equal protection
cases."' Another is the omission-commission dichotomy. Many of
the above explanations of stare decisis categories can be applied in
slightly modified form to partly explain these and other legal dichot-
omies. For example, the vagueness allows the law the flexible capac-
ity to adapt to changed conditions and the individual case; it also
allows seeming consensus among judges of disparate views. In addi-
tion, hiding the vagueness creates the illusion of greater neutrality,
predictability and uniformity than there is in actuality. Moreover,
the dichotomies may reflect a binary vision of the law as manifest-
ing order and reason.
It should be noted that the above-mentioned categories are being
used at intermediate stages of legal analysis: the court's choice of
one or another category does not itself determine whether there is
legal liability. In contrast are legal categories serving as conclusions
such as guilt-innocence, attempt-preparation, mental illness-
mental health,"3 and insanity-sanity."' In these latter dichotomies,
courts necessarily draw an artificial line between opposite para-
digms by virtue of the requirement of finding a defendant either
liable or not liable. It should also be noted that many of the above-
mentioned legal dichotomies derive from moral or other lay ana-
logs. 15 Altered forms of the reasons set forth in this section also help
to explain these lay analogs.
CONCLUSION
Superficially, the law draws a discrete line between stare decisis
and non-stare decisis precedents; but underneath the surface, the
law presents a continuum of degrees of influence along which pre-
cedents and parts of precedents are arrayed. Legal words, concepts
and theories join in furnishing this surface appearance of stability
112 See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
" See Hardisty, supra note 109.
"' Hardisty, Insanity as a Divorce Defense, 12 J. FAm4. L. 1 (1972).
" See, e.g., id.; Hardisty, supra note 109.
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while allowing subterranean change.
What the law presents as black and white resolves on analysis into
shades of grey.

